THE HONORABLE JUDGE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

CHONG and MARILYN YIM, KELLY LYLES, EILEEN, LLC, and RENTAL HOUSING ASSOCIATION OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiffs, vs. THE CITY OF SEATTLE, a Washington Municipal Corporation, Defendant.	No. 2:18-cv-00736-JCC PIONEER HUMAN SERVICES AND THE TENANTS UNION OF WASHINGTON'S MOTION TO INTERVENE NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR: August 17, 2018 **Oral Argument Requested**

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

I. INTRODUCTION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

In 2017, the City of Seattle (City) passed the Fair Chance Housing Ordinance (Ordinance) to ensure equal housing opportunities for people with criminal records. The Ordinance resulted from several years of advocacy by individuals impacted by their criminal records and supportive advocacy organizations, who recognized barriers to housing faced by people with criminal records and how well-established racial inequities in the criminal justice system compounded those barriers for people of color. Notwithstanding the Ordinance's laudable goals, the Rental Housing Association (RHA), a powerful organization that lobbies for landlords' interests, as well as three landlords, filed this action, claiming that the Ordinance violates constitutional due process and free speech rights.

Pioneer Human Services (Pioneer) and the Tenants Union of Washington (TU) are nonprofit organizations that assist and advocate for people who will directly benefit from the Ordinance's protections but who currently have no opportunity to be heard in this case. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), they move for leave to intervene as of right as defendants in this action. In the alternative, they request permission to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).[1]

II. PROPOSED INTERVENORS

A. Pioneer Human Services

Pioneer, a Seattle-based nonprofit organization, is the oldest and largest reentry services provider in Washington, founded in 1963 to support people returning to the community post-incarceration. Young Decl. ¶ 2. In addition to helping people with criminal records secure housing and employment, Pioneer develops affordable housing and is the sole provider in

[1] As Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c) requires, a proposed Answer to the Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

Washington of residential reentry services for people released from federal prison. *Id.* ¶ 3. A significant and disproportionate number of the people whom Pioneer serves are people of color. *Id.* ¶ 4. Besides providing direct services, Pioneer advocates for legal and policy changes promoting the rights of people reentering the community. *Id.* ¶ 3. One of Pioneer's advocacy priorities is supporting efforts to increase housing availability for people with criminal records. *Id*. Pioneer also recognizes the need for anti-discrimination laws that recognize racial bias in the criminal justice system and the resulting housing discrimination. *Id.* ¶ 4.

Pioneer actively participates in the Fair and Accessible Renting for Everyone coalition (FARE), a group of community members and organizations whose efforts resulted in passage of the Ordinance. Young Decl. ¶ 5. Central to FARE's advocacy are beliefs that: housing is an essential right for everyone, regardless of an individual's criminal record; criminal records, which disproportionately impact communities of color, remain an unnecessary barrier to rental housing; and fair and effective housing laws like the Ordinance will help move Seattle beyond its history of segregation and discrimination. *Id.*[2] Invalidation of the Ordinance would deny the people Pioneer serves significant opportunities to find housing in Seattle and would require Pioneer to allocate more time and resources advocating for these individuals. Young Decl. ¶ 6.

B. Tenants Union of Washington

TU is a Washington nonprofit organization that has engaged in tenant education, outreach, organizing, and advocacy since 1977. Lavatai Decl. ¶ 2. TU works to create improvements in tenants' living conditions and challenge and transform unjust housing policies

[2] FARE is independent of the Mayor's Fair Chance Housing Committee, which was convened to address rental housing discrimination, *see* Gunning Decl., Ex. 3, at 5, for several reasons, including the need to amplify the voices of individuals personally affected by this issue. *See* Young Decl. ¶ 5; Lavatai Decl. ¶ 6.

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

and practices. *Id*. It is a membership organization who believes that tenants themselves must be the leaders of efforts to transform housing conditions. *Id*. Members pay dues on a sliding scale and help shape the direction of TU's work. *Id.*

In addition to its education and outreach work, TU and its members have taken a leadership role on legislative advocacy supporting tenants' rights legislation, including advocacy for anti-discrimination laws limiting landlords' use of criminal records in rental decisions. *Id.* ¶¶ 4-5. TU's work on this issue is grounded in the recognition that Seattle residents with arrest or conviction records are disproportionately people of color and that laws that recognize racial bias in the criminal justice system can prevent the housing discrimination that bias creates. *Id*. TU's advocacy is informed by its multiracial and multicultural leadership and membership and its staff's lived experience. *Id*. Most tenants TU serves are very low income, people of color, women, and/or immigrants or refugees. *Id*. TU, like Pioneer, actively participates in FARE and was a key player in the Ordinance's passage. *Id.* ¶ 6-7. Invalidation of the Ordinance would deny TU members with criminal records and others who rely on TU's advocacy significant opportunities to find housing in Seattle and would require TU to allocate more time and resources advocating for them. *Id.* ¶ 7.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Seattle Has a Long History of Race Discrimination in Housing.

Seattle has a shameful history of race discrimination in housing. Racially restrictive covenants and entrenched redlining practices resulted in a city with few neighborhoods where people of color could find housing. Gunning Decl., Ex. 1. The City did not pass a law prohibiting race discrimination in housing until 1968. Gunning Decl., Ex. 2. Before 1968, the City Council

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

rejected community groups' multiple requests for a fair housing ordinance. *Id.* Opponents claimed fair housing laws "would infringe on constitutional property rights, were dictatorial, confiscatory, and would lead to evasion and disrespect for the law." *Id.* (citing the *Seattle Times*, 1961). When an ordinance was placed on the ballot in 1964, it was overwhelmingly rejected, with opponents claiming it would violate their property and privacy rights. *Id.*

Fair housing laws arise from a fundamental principle: individuals have privacy rights, but "[w]here one opens one's home to the public by engaging in the rental of rooms therein for monetary gain, one must be deemed to have voluntarily subordinated personal privacy rights to those state interests which can be shown to be compelling." *Voris v. Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n*, 41 Wn. App. 283, 290-91, 704 P.2d 632, 636 (1985) (rejecting argument of landlord who refused to rent room to a black person that "her right to choose the people with whom she will share her home outweighs the State's interest in preventing discrimination"). The 1968 ordinance was the first step in addressing historic bias limiting access to housing for communities of color; over 40 years later, Pioneer and TU continued that fight.

B. The Fair Chance Housing Ordinance.

The City Council unanimously voted to adopt the Ordinance on August 14, 2017. Gunning Ex. 3 at 29. It was signed into law by the mayor on August 23, 2017, and went into effect on February 18, 2018. *Id.* The law was developed in response to community concerns about barriers people with criminal backgrounds faced when attempting to secure rental housing, and in collaboration with stakeholders, including renters and their advocates. *See id.* at 4.

The Ordinance's goals include reducing race discrimination and recidivism, and promoting reintegration through access to housing. *Id*. It seeks to achieve these goals in several

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

ways. It prohibits landlords from automatically rejecting tenants because of their arrest record, conviction record, or criminal history. SMC § 14.09.025(A)(1). It also forbids housing providers from asking about or "requir[ing] the disclosure of" their arrest record, conviction record, or criminal history. SMC § 14.09.025(A)(2). And, it bars landlords from carrying out any "adverse action" based on nearly all criminal history, except for certain sex offenses. SMC § 14.09.025(2)-(5). Adverse actions including "[d]enying tenancy," falsely "[r]epresenting that…[the] property is not available," "[t]erminating a lease," and "refusing to add a household member to any existing lease." SMC § 14.09.010 (defining "adverse action"). The Ordinance is enforced by the Seattle Office for Civil Rights. SMC §§ 14.09.035(B)-(C), .045, .060.

C. Procedural History.

On May 1, 2018, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in King County Superior Court seeking invalidation of the Ordinance and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. Dkt. 1-1. The City removed the case and answered the complaint. Dkt. 1, Dkt. 8. On July 20, 2018, the Court granted the parties' stipulated motion in which they agreed this case can be resolved through summary judgment motions based on an agreed record and set briefing deadlines. Dkt. 10.

IV. ARGUMENT

Rule 24 allows intervention both as a matter of right and permissively. The Ninth Circuit has a strong preference for liberal evaluation of the requirements for granting intervention. *See Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted), *abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc'y v. United States Forest Serv.*, 630 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (a "liberal policy in favor of intervention serves both efficient resolution of issues and broadened access to the courts"). The court must accept as true

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

all "nonconclusory allegations" in the motion to intervene, accompanying pleading in intervention, and supporting declarations, "absent sham, frivolity or other objections." *Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg*, 268 F.3d 810, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2001). As shown below, Pioneer and TU satisfy all requirements for intervention by right, as well as for permissive intervention.

A. The Court Should Grant Pioneer and TU Intervention as of Right.

"[G]uided primarily by practical considerations," courts broadly construe four criteria when evaluating a Rule 24(a) motion to intervene by right: (1) the motion is timely; (2) the proposed intervenor " has a significant protectable interest relating to the property…which is the subject of the action;" (3) "the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter impair or impede [the proposed intervenor's] ability to protect its interest;" and (4) "the existing parties may not adequately represent the applicant's interest." *Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass'n*, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citation and marks omitted).

1. This motion to intervene is timely.

Courts consider three factors when exercising discretion to determine whether a motion to intervene is timely: (1) the stage of the proceeding; (2) prejudice to existing parties; and (3) "the reason for and length of the delay" in moving to intervene. *United States ex rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co.*, 967 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Pioneer and TU have moved to intervene at an early stage of this litigation; thus, delay is not at issue. The Complaint was filed less than four months ago, *see* Dkt. 1-1, and there have been no rulings on substantive issues. *See Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt*, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995) (motion to intervene filed four months after complaint was timely).

The only "prejudice" relevant to timeliness "is that which flows from a prospective

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

intervenor's failure to intervene after he knew, or reasonably should have known, that his interests were not being adequately represented[.]" *Smith v. L.A. United Sch. Dist.*, 830 F.3d 843, 857 (9th Cir. 2016). "[T]he fact that including another party in the case might make resolution more difficult" is irrelevant when assessing timeliness of a motion to intervene. *Id.* (citation and marks omitted). Given the early stage of this case, intervention will not prejudice the parties. A scheduling order is in place for summary judgment motions, to be based on an agreed record. If intervention is granted, Pioneer and TU will confer with the parties about an amended briefing schedule and adding materials to the record. Gunning Decl. ¶ 8.

2. Pioneer and TU have significant protectable interests.

A proposed intervenor has a "significant protectable interest" in an action when "the injunctive relief sought by plaintiff will have direct, immediate, and harmful effects upon [the proposed intervenor's] legally protectable interests." *Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity*, 268 F.3d at 818. Courts have routinely granted a law's intended beneficiaries, and those who represent and advocate their interests, leave to intervene in an action challenging the law. *See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Andrus*, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding proposed intervenor group had an interest in litigation because its members were persons Congress intended to benefit by passage of a statute). Indeed, "[a] public interest group is entitled as a matter of right to intervene in an action challenging the legality of a measure it has supported." *Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n*, 58 F.3d at 1397 (intervention granted to advocacy groups who were active in process leading to challenged agency action); *Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt*, 713 F.2d 525, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1983) (intervenors had protected interest in defending creation of conservation area they helped create); *State of Idaho v. Freeman*, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1980) (allowing National

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

Organization for Women (NOW) to intervene in case challenging validity of ratification procedures of Equal Rights Amendment, which it had actively supported); *Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller*, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245-1247 (6th Cir. 1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit's broader rule to find proposed public interest group intervenor had "substantial legal interest" in case because it was a "vital participant in the political process" leading to enactment of challenged law).

The Ordinance directly and substantially benefits people Pioneer and TU serve and both are public interest organizations who were deeply involved in efforts to pass the Ordinance. Plaintiffs seek relief that would destroy the protections Pioneer and TU have always fought for.

3. Pioneer and TU's ability to protect their interests may be impaired by the disposition of this action.

Once the court finds a significant protectable interest, it should have "little difficulty concluding that the disposition of th[e] case may, as a practical matter, affect" the proposed intervenor. *See Citizens for Balanced Use*, 647 F.3d at 898; *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee note ("[i]f an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene…."). Here, the "impairment" requirement is easily satisfied. If Plaintiffs prevail, Pioneer and TU and the people they serve will be stripped of vital protections. And, if they are denied intervention, they "will have no legal means to challenge th[e] injunction" Plaintiffs seek. *See Forest Conservation Council*, 66 F.3d at 1498; *see also United States v. Oregon*, 839 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988) ("recognizing practical limitations on the ability of intervention applicants to protect interests in the subject of the litigation after court-ordered equitable remedies are in place").

4. The City does not adequately represent Pioneer and TU's interests.

The "burden of showing inadequacy of representation is minimal and may be satisfied if

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

the applicant can demonstrate that representation of its interests may be inadequate." *Citizens for Balanced Use*, 647 F.3d at 898 (citations and marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit uses a three-part test for addressing "inadequacy": "(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor's arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect." *Id.* (citation and marks omitted). The "most important factor," however, is "how the interest compares with the interests of existing parties." *Id.* (citation and marks omitted). There is "an assumption of adequacy" if the "government is acting on behalf of a constituency that it represents," but "the government's representation of the public interest may not be identical to the individual parochial interest of a particular group just because both entities occupy the same posture in the litigation." *Id*. at 898-99 (citation and marks omitted). Thus, even when the government is defending a law, if the proposed intervenor's interests are not identical this distinction is sufficient to merit granting intervention. *See Forest Conservation Council*, 66 F.3d at 1499.

Here, Pioneer and TU have made a threshold showing that the City does not adequately represent their interests. First, the City's obligation to defend the Ordinance is on behalf of *all* Seattle residents, not just people with criminal records. Indeed, the Ordinance as enacted was prompted in significant part by the advocacy of Pioneer, TU, and others who successfully lobbied over several years for passage of the Ordinance. Even when the Ordinance was close to passage, Pioneer, TU, and other FARE members worked to make it even stronger. Lavatai Decl. ¶ 6; Young Decl. ¶ 5. The Mayor's original bill allowed the use of criminal background checks by landlords for convictions within the previous two years. *Id.*; Gunning Decl., Ex. 4. But FARE

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

and other advocates argued that a two-year "lookback period" would be discriminatory and wrong if no evidence exists to support the use of criminal background checks in tenant screening.. Lavatai Decl. ¶ 6; Young Decl. ¶ 5. As a result, the bill was amended to prohibit the use of criminal records in tenant screening entirely. *Id.*; Gunning Decl., Ex. 3. Under such circumstances, where the City adopted amendments in response to this advocacy, inadequacy of representation is patent. *Cf. Citizens for Balanced Use*, 647 F.3d at 900.

Second, "willingness to suggest a limiting construction in defense of a statute is an important consideration in determining whether the government will adequately represent its constituents' interests." *California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States*, 450 F.3d 436, 444 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, there is a risk the City may view the Ordinance's scope differently than Pioneer and TU. For example, it appears the Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) may take the position that it need not comply with the Ordinance; the Mayor declared a moratorium with respect to enforcement of the Ordinance as to SHA. Gunning Decl., Exs. 5, 6. It is unclear if the City believes public housing providers are exempt.[3] Pioneer and TU oppose a reading of the Ordinance that would exempt public housing providers.

Finally, Pioneer and TU can provide the Court with an on-the-ground perspective on the effects of housing discrimination related to criminal records, including the disparate impact criminal record screening has on communities of color. The City does not have the same stake in this matter as Pioneer and TU – organizations representing the interests of, and advocating for,

[3] The City's Answer contributes to this ambiguity. *Compare* Complaint (Dkt. 1-1) ¶ 15 ("the City sought only to regulate private rental housing") *with* Answer (Dkt. 8) ¶ 15 ("[t]o the extent that paragraph 15 of the Complaint consists of characterizations of the recitals of Ordinance 125393 or documents cited in those recitals, the recitals and documents speak for themselves, and the City DENIES those characterizations. To the extent that paragraph 15 contains allegations within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B), the City DENIES those allegations").

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

people who experience discrimination in housing due to their criminal records. Part of this perspective is challenging Plaintiffs' claims that studies in the legislative record supporting the Ordinance include statements "unsupported by fact or law," or "omit key facts[.]" Complaint (Dkt. 1-1) ¶¶ 58-60. The City responds that the studies "speak for themselves," Answer (Dkt. 8) ¶¶ 58-61, but by agreeing to a stipulated record, the City cannot submit expert opinions regarding the studies. If intervention is granted, Pioneer and TU will request permission to submit expert opinions and other relevant information with summary judgment briefing, to meaningfully challenge Plaintiffs' arguments. Gunning Decl. ¶ 8.

B. In the Alternative, Pioneer and TU Should Be Granted Permissive Intervention.

Even if the Court finds intervention as of right is unwarranted, permissive intervention is appropriate. "Unlike [R]ule 24(a), a 'significant protectable interest' is not required by Rule 24(b) for intervention; all that is necessary for permissive intervention is that intervenor's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." *Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman*, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002). Once this standard is met, permissive intervention is within the court's discretion, after considering whether intervention will unduly delay the case or unfairly prejudice the existing parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).

Here, the Court should exercise its discretion to permit Pioneer and TU to intervene. Their defense of the Ordinance presents common questions of law and fact with the City's defense and they only seek to defend the Ordinance against Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge. Further, Pioneer and TU seek to ensure that the importance of the Ordinance is considered from the perspective of those who will benefit from it. This motion is timely and the significance of Pioneer and TU's interests outweighs any marginal burden that will be caused by intervention.

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

See United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 404-05 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that "the idea of 'streamlining' the litigation…should not be accomplished at the risk of marginalizing those…who have some of the strongest interests in the outcome").

Courts have granted permissive intervention to groups advocating for tenants' interests in cases where landlords have challenged tenant-protective ordinances and government practices. *See, e.g., Miller v. Silbermann*, 827 F. Supp. 663, 673-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting permissive intervention to tenant advocates in landlord's challenge of housing court practices); *Chicago Bd. of Realtors v. City of Chicago*, 673 F. Supp. 224, 228 (N.D. Ill. 1986), *aff'd*, 819 F.2d 732 (7th Cir. 1987) (granting permissive intervention to "representatives of tenants' interests" in constitutional challenge to landlord-tenant ordinance). As the court explained in *Miller*, where plaintiffs representing landlords' interests sued the New York City housing court "claim[ing] that as a result of the alleged systemic bias of the Housing Court against owners, disputes are often unsettled unfairly in favor of tenants[,]" "considerations of fairness strongly weigh in favor of permissive intervention as the Tenants, in light of their knowledge and concern, will greatly contribute to the Court's understanding of this case." 827 F. Supp. at 666, 674.

V. CONCLUSION

The Ordinance was birthed by people on whose behalf it was enacted and by the advocacy of organizations like Pioneer and TU who help amplify their voices. RHA will have its day in court to represent landlords' interests. As a matter of fundamental fairness, organizations representing the Ordinance's intended beneficiaries should also have the opportunity to be heard. Pioneer and TU respectfully request the Court grant their motion to intervene.

Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of August, 2018.

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 (phone); (206) 382-3386 (fax)

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES

/s/ KIMBERLEE L. GUNNING
Kimberlee L. Gunning, WSBA #35366
Kim.Gunning@columbialegal.org
Hillary Madsen, WSBA #41038
Hillary.Madsen@columbialegal.org
Nicholas B. Allen, WSBA #42990
Nick.Allen@columbialegal.org
Attorneys for Proposed Defendant-Intervenors
Columbia Legal Services
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 – phone
(206) 382-3386 – fax

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing document, Pioneer Human Services and the Tenants Union of Washington's Motion to Intervene, with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following parties:

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

Brian T. Hodges
Ethan W. Blevins
Pacific Legal Foundation
10940 NE 33rd Place, Suite 210
Bellevue, WA 98004
425-576-0484
bth@pacificlegal.org
eblevins@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Defendants:

Roger Douglas Wynne
Seattle City Attorney's Office
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104-7097
206-233-2177
roger.wynne@seattle.gov

Sara O'Connor-Kriss
Seattle City Attorney's Office
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104-7097
206-615-0788
sara.oconnor-kriss@seattle.gov

DATED August 2, 2018 at Seattle, Washington.

COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES

By: /s/ Kimberlee L. Gunning
Kimberlee L. Gunning, WSBA #35366
Of Attorneys for Proposed Defendant-Intervenors
Columbia Legal Services
Institutions Project
101 Yesler Way, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-0838 – phone
(206) 382-3386 – fax